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The enormous impact of offshore accounts and bank secrecy
on developing countries raises a critical question: Do states like
Switzerland, which provide a tax haven for wealthy citizens of
developing countries, violate internationally recognized human rights?
The implementation of FATCA has begun to end bank secrecy
and to require automatic information reporting of income earned by
U.S. citizens in offshore investment accounts. Moreover, recent
commitments by Austria, Luxembourg, and Switzerland mark a
beginning to the end of bank secrecy in Europe and movement
toward automatic information reporting of income earned by
European citizens in offshore accounts in European countries. 1 In
addition, in June the G-8 issued a call for world-wide automatic
information reporting,2 and the OECD is expected to issue a similar
call.
Nevertheless, other than hortatory statements from the G-8 and
probably the OECD, there is no concrete progress yet toward ending
bank secrecy and instituting automatic information reporting for the
offshore accounts of citizens from developing countries outside the
U.S. and Europe. Moreover, for the developing world, the tax gap
created by offshore accounts is a much larger problem than for
already developed, industrialized economies. Only about 2% of
North American private wealth and 8% of European wealth is
1

Andrew Higgins, Europe Pushes to Shed Stigma of a Tax Haven,
The New York Times, May 23, 2013, page 1.
2

https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_
data/file/207543/180613_LOUGH_ERNE_DECLARATION.pdf

1

invested offshore, compared with more than 25% of Latin American
and 33% of Middle Eastern and African private wealth.3
What is the magnitude of the tax gap created for developing
countries by offshore accounts? Information about the income and
assets in most offshore accounts is currently subject to laws that
require confidentiality and make disclosure of such information a
crime. Thus, estimates of the tax gap caused by offshore accounts
are difficult to produce and may be unreliable. According to one
estimate, tax revenues lost each year by offshore tax evasion,
including offshore accounts, may approximate all official worldwide
development assistance, on the order of $120 billion a year.4 More
recent estimates by the Tax Justice Network suggest that the total
offshore wealth held by citizens or residents of the developing world
is two or three times more than previously thought and that the lost
tax revenue may consequently be much greater.5
What is certain is that the magnitude is growing. According to
the leading authority, Prof. Itai Grinberg, “The capacity to make, hold,
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and manage investments through offshore financial institutions has
increased dramatically in recent years, while the cost of such services
has plummeted. Individuals now find it substantially easier to
underreport or fail to report investment earnings through the use of
offshore accounts, and experience suggests that such accounts may
also be used to help evade tax on income earned domestically by
closely held businesses. Consequently, the principal held in offshore
accounts, as well as the investment earnings generated through such
accounts, may go untaxed.”6
Moreover, according to Prof. Grinberg, “In many [developing]
economies, the bulk of the individual income tax base is often
comprised of a concentrated group of well-off individuals. Domestic
financial institutions are also often relatively undeveloped. [I]t is
commonplace for the wealthy to hold investments through offshore
accounts. . . . Thus, the taxation of offshore wealth should be of
greater relative importance to Latin America, the Middle East, and
Africa, than to the United States and Canada or the major European
economies.”7
No international human rights agreement mentions bank
secrecy or tax evasion. Moreover, no international tax treaty
mentions human rights. Nevertheless, bank secrecy has a significant
human rights impact if governments of developing countries are
deprived of resources needed to meet basic economic rights
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guaranteed by the United Nations Covenant on Economic, Social,
and Cultural Rights. The Covenant came into force in 1976 and
currently has 160 member state parties. Among states that are
parties to the Treaty are even several notorious offshore account
jurisdictions, including Switzerland and Luxembourg (but not
Singapore).
The Covenant explicitly recognizes individual rights to adequate
food, clothing, and housing (Article 11); health care, clean water, and
sanitation (Article 12); and education (Article 13). The Covenant also
imposes obligations on member states to implement these rights.
Article 2 states:
“Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take
steps . . . , to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to
achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in
the present Covenant . . . .”
The Covenant acknowledges constraints on government ability
to meet these obligations due to limits of available resources but also
imposes an obligation to progressively improve, that is, to take steps
to realize the rights enumerated in the Covenant. Thus, under the
Covenant, states have the obligation of “progressive realization.”
One issue is whether obligations under the Covenant extend
extraterritorially. Do parties have an obligation to progressively
improve the enumerated rights, not only in those territories over
which they have jurisdiction, but also in territories over which they do
not? Although there is no explicit language restricting the obligations
to a state’s own territory, one has the sense in reading the Covenant
that extraterritorial obligations were not considered or intended.
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Nevertheless, at least one committee of legal experts,
convened by Maastricht University and the International Commission
of Jurists, interprets the Covenant to impose extraterritorial
obligations. In February 2012, this committee proposed the so-called
“Maastricht Principles,” under which:
“A State has obligations to respect, protect and fulfill
economic . . . rights recognized by the ESC Covenant in . . .
situations over which State acts or omissions bring about foreseeable
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More specifically, Articles 19 and 20 of The Maastricht
Principles call on states to “refrain from conduct which nullifies or
impairs the enjoyment and exercise of economic . . . rights of persons
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outside their territories . . . or which impairs the ability of another
State to comply with that State’s . . . obligations as regards economic
rights.”
There are two further possible objections to concluding that a
state providing a tax haven for offshore accounts violates human
rights recognized by the Covenant. Even if the government of the
account holder receives information about the offshore account, it
may lack the capacity to collect the revenue that is legally owed.
Even if the revenue is collected, there is no assurance that it will be
used to progressively realize the rights recognized by the Covenant.
Thus, there is no certainty of an actual connection between one
country providing secrecy for investment accounts of the taxpayers of
another country and the resulting failure of the second country to
progressively realize Covenant rights.
There are also varying degrees of state responsibility for the
offshore accounts within its jurisdiction. The degree of responsibility
may depend on whether a state enacts bank secrecy laws
criminalizing the disclosure of financial information to tax authorities,
fails to apply a withholding tax on offshore accounts at a rate
sufficient to deter their use for tax evasion, evades requests for
information about offshore accounts from other governments
conducting taxpayer investigations, or otherwise limits efforts to allow
for more extensive automatic information exchange. The
responsibility is particularly great in the case of Switzerland, which
manages 30% of all individual wealth held through offshore accounts,
has a legal regime that has criminalized the disclosure of financial
information, and has refused to withhold tax on offshore account
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income or provide financial information about offshore accounts,
except when under enormous pressure from powerful governments,
such as Germany, the UK, and the United States, or when it views
agreeing to provide withholding to a given group of countries (weak
EU states) as a mechanism to limit pressure to help other, often
poorer (at least on a GDP/capita basis) states.
No international mechanism exists for actually enforcing the
Covenant, even when a clear violation is established. Parties to the
covenant are required to submit regular reports to a UN Committee
on implementation and an optional protocol, not yet in force, would
permit individuals to submit complaints of violations.
Thus, it may not be crucial to definitively determine whether, as
a technical matter, the maintenance of secrecy for offshore accounts
constitutes a violation of internationally recognized human rights.
Whether state obligations under the Covenant are extraterritorial,
whether revenues owed would actually be collected, and, whether, if
collected, revenues would be appropriately used is less important
than recognizing the fact that secrecy for offshore accounts makes it
difficult for developing countries to implement Covenant obligations.
It therefore seems indisputable that offshore accounts impede the
fulfillment of internationally recognized human rights. Recognition of
this fact could accelerate the growing international effort to curb bank
secrecy for offshore accounts and establish a multilateral automatic
information exchange system so that developing countries, as well as
industrialized countries, benefit.
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